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Origins of the Federal 
Reserve Book-Entry System
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
t is difficult to imagine the modern Treasury securities
 market operating in the absence of a book-entry system. 
Nevertheless, as recently as the mid-1960s, the U.S. 
government’s promises to pay interest and principal were 
evidenced exclusively by engraved certificates setting forth the 
promises in writing. That practice changed in 1966, when 
Treasury securities began to be converted to book-entry, or 
nonphysical, form. The conversion, completed over two 
decades (see time line on next page), led to a market with 
sharply lower operating costs and risks.
This article examines the origins and early development of 
the Federal Reserve’s book-entry system—the system most 
closely associated with the elimination of definitive, or 
certificated, Treasury securities. We suggest that the Fed’s 
system was the product of three important factors: the desire of 
the Reserve Banks and the U.S. Treasury to reduce their 
operating costs and risks, the interest of the Reserve Banks and 
the Treasury in preserving the liquidity of the Treasury market, 
and the goal of the Reserve Banks to decrease member bank 
operating costs.
Despite the significance of these factors, the early history of 
the book-entry system suggests that the mere prospect of 
greater efficiency may not always suffice to bring about rapid 
change that requires coordination among diverse market 
Kenneth D. Garbade is a vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York.
<kenneth.garbade@ny.frb.org>
The author thanks Maryalice Cassidy, Jeffrey Ingber, Betsy Irwin, Rosalie 
Kurtz, Rosemary Lazenby, Lee Rassnick, Don Ringsmuth, William Silber, 
Hugh Tidwell, Lawrence White, Hank Wiener, and two anonymous referees 
for assistance in researching this article and for comments on earlier drafts. 
Special thanks to Gregory Rappa for his extraordinary efforts in locating 
documents. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal 
Reserve System.
• In the mid-1960s, U.S. Treasury securities 
were represented by physical certificates 
setting forth the government’s promises to 
pay interest and principal on the debt.
• The costs and risks associated with 
safekeeping and transferring bearer Treasury 
securities had become so large that market 
participants sought more efficient ways to 
manage the securities.
• In response, the U.S. Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve in 1966 began to convert Treasury 
securities to book-entry, or nonphysical, form. 
• The conversion was driven by the interest of 
the Reserve Banks and Treasury in lowering 
their operating costs and risks, the desire of 
the Reserve Banks and Treasury to preserve 
market liquidity, and the goal of the Reserve 
Banks to prune member bank operating costs.
• The book-entry system that emerged led to a 
Treasury market with sharply lower operating 
costs and risks.
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participants. The pace of change may also depend on incidents 
that focus attention, provide motivation, and create a 
commonality of interests. Two such “shocks” spurred the 
development of the book-entry system. The first, a loss of 
$7.5 million of Treasury securities at a Federal Reserve Bank in 
1962, provided the initial impetus for a limited system designed 
to reduce the costs and risks of custodial services already 
provided by the Reserve Banks. The second, an “insurance 
crisis” that threatened to impair the liquidity of the Treasury 
market in 1970-71, injected a sense of urgency into expanding 
the system to include securities that were not safekept at 
Reserve Banks. The repercussions of these two incidents were 
critical factors in motivating market participants to move from 
definitive to book-entry securities as quickly as they did.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
ownership and transfer of definitive Treasury securities prior to 
1966. Section 3 presents the origins of an important early-stage 
book-entry system: the Government Securities Clearing 
Arrangement (GSCA), sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. Finally, the development of the larger, 
Systemwide book-entry system is explained in Sections 4 and 5.
 2. Ownership and Transfer of 
Definitive Treasury Securities
As of the early 1960s, definitive Treasury bonds came in two 
forms: bearer and registered. Outside of residual quantities of 
three dozen issues due to mature before the end of 2016, 
neither form exists today. This section describes the two forms 
and explains why secondary-market transactions were usually 
settled with bearer bonds.1
2.1 Bearer Bonds
A bearer bond consisted of a “corpus,” or main body, stating 
the government’s promise to pay principal and interest, and a 
series of detachable coupons, each of which was a claim to an 
interest payment on a specific date. The government’s 
promises ran to whomever held the bond, that is, to the bearer; 
a bondholder could transfer ownership of his claims by 
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variety of denominations. A bondholder could effect a 
denominational exchange by tendering, for example, one 
$100,000 bond to the Treasury or a Federal Reserve Bank and 
requesting ten $10,000 bonds. (As described in Box 1, Federal 
Reserve Banks acted as “fiscal agents” of the United States when 
they undertook activities such as denominational exchanges of 
bearer Treasury bonds.)
Since the Treasury had no way of knowing who held a bearer 
bond when a payment on the bond came due, it could not 
disburse the payment on its own initiative; it had to wait until 
the holder asserted a claim. To claim an interest payment, a 
holder detached the appropriate coupon and sent it, through 
the banking system, to a Federal Reserve Bank for collection. 
When the bond matured, the holder asserted his claim for 
payment of principal by sending the corpus for collection.
2.2 Registered Bonds
A bond was said to be registered if the government’s promise to 
pay principal and interest ran to a person whose name and 
address were recorded with the Treasury. There was an 
engraved certificate associated with a registered bond, on the 
face of which the name of the owner appeared, but it served 
primarily as a device for effecting change in the record of 
Box 1
Federal Reserve Banks as Fiscal Agents of the United States
Section 15 of the Federal Reserve Act provides that the cash 
balances of the federal government “may, upon the direction of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, be deposited in Federal reserve banks, 
which banks, when required by the Secretary . . . shall act as fiscal 
agents of the United States.” Prior to 1913, the Treasury received, 
carried, and disbursed public funds through nationally chartered 
banks and through an “Independent Treasury” system that had 
been in place since 1846. Section 15 reflected the conclusion of 
Congress and other observers that the system did not meet the 
needs of the country.a On November 23, 1915, Treasury Secretary 
William McAdoo appointed the twelve Federal Reserve Banks as 
depositaries and fiscal agents, effective January 1, 1916, and 
authorized them to accept deposits of public funds and to pay 
checks written on those deposits, “as well as [to perform] any other 
services incident to or growing out of the duties and responsi-
bilities of fiscal agents.” b
Although the principal focus of Section 15 was the role of the 
Reserve Banks as providers of payment services to the federal 
government,c during World War I the Banks began to provide a 
variety of debt-related services as fiscal agents. They acted as 
administrative centers for the Liberty Loan committees set up to 
market Liberty bonds and Victory notes, they received 
subscriptions for new securities, and they accommodated requests 
for denominational exchanges. Additionally, they acted as agents 
for the sale and redemption of short-term certificates of 
indebtedness.d (The Reserve Banks continue to this day to act as 
fiscal agents of the United States in the sale and redemption of 
Treasury bills, notes, and bonds. Manypenny and Bermudez 
[1992] provide a recent overview of payment-related and debt-
related services of the Federal Reserve Banks as depositories and 
fiscal agents.)
World War I also saw the beginning of what became the 
Treasury Tax and Loan system. Proceeds from sales of Treasury 
securities were retained by commercial banks in War Loan Deposit 
Accounts (rather than transferred to Treasury accounts at Federal 
Reserve Banks) in order to avoid draining reserves from the private 
banking system. The banks were required to pledge assets to ensure 
repayment. The pledged assets were held at Federal Reserve Banks 
acting as fiscal agents of the United States.e
a See Kinley (1910) and Chapman (1923, pp. 27-41).
bFederal Reserve Board (1915) and U.S. Department of the Treasury (1917, p. 6). Congress discontinued the 
  Independent Treasury system in 1921.
c See, for example, the discussion in Committee on Banking and Currency (1913, pp. 27-9).
d Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1919, 1922) and Chapman (1923, pp. 70-104).
e Treasury Department Circular no. 92, Division of Public Moneys, “Special Deposits of Public Moneys,” April 17, 1919, Chapman (1923, 
  pp. 150-63), and U.S. Department of the Treasury (1927, pp. 114-5). The origin and development of the Treasury Tax and Loan program 
  are sketched in Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (1973), Lovett (1978), and Lang (1979).36 Origins of the Federal Reserve Book-Entry System
ownership. An investor who wanted to convey a registered 
bond to a new owner inscribed the re-registration instructions 
on the back of the bond and sent it to the Treasury. The 
Treasury would then change its records and issue a new 
certificate to the new owner. 
The Treasury’s records were the locus of a bondholder’s 
claim to the payments on a registered bond. Because it knew 
the name and address of the owner, the Treasury could send 
checks for periodic interest payments directly to the owner on 
its own initiative, without requiring tender of coupons. It could 
have done the same for the principal payment, but instead 
required tender of the certificate as a way to recover matured 
certificates.
2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages 
of Bearer and Registered Bonds
Investors could hold bonds in either bearer or registered form, 
and they could exchange one form for the other. Each form had 
advantages and disadvantages. Bearer bonds could be 
transferred readily but had to be kept safe from loss, 
destruction, and theft. Institutional owners typically 
contracted with commercial banks for custodial services. 
Holders of bearer bonds, or their custodial agents, also had to 
clip and send in for collection the coupons on the bonds. This 
process was surprisingly expensive for banks that had to clip 
and collect coupons from thousands of bonds.2
Matters of safekeeping, transport, and payment were 
simpler for registered bonds. The bonds could be replaced if 
they were lost, stolen, or destroyed, so it was less important to 
provide exceptionally secure safekeeping. Additionally, the 
Treasury paid interest on the bonds without requiring tender 
of coupons. However, changing the record of ownership of a 
registered bond was a time-consuming process, and the 
Treasury did not allow transfers during the thirty days 
preceding an interest payment.
2.4 Treasury Bills
A Treasury bill is a promise of the U.S. government to pay a 
specified amount on a specified maturity date. Treasury bills 
mature in no more than one year following issue and do not 
pay any coupons, either prior to or at maturity. Definitive bills 
were issued only in bearer form. Like bearer bonds, bills were 
available in a variety of denominations, had to be presented for 
payment, and had to be protected against loss, destruction, 
and theft.
2.5 Settling Purchases and Sales of Definitive 
Treasury Securities
Prior to 1966, as now, investors valued Treasury securities for 
their liquidity as well as for their creditworthiness. Many 
institutional investors kept their bonds in bearer form so that 
the bonds could be delivered quickly in the event of sale; in the 
early 1960s, more than 90 percent of marketable Treasury debt 
was held in bearer form.3 Treasury bills were never made 
available in registered form because there was hardly any 
demand for a short-term security that could not be transferred 
quickly.
Investors typically settled secondary-market transactions 
by transferring bearer securities from one custodial bank to 
another. The process of transferring securities within a city 
started when a seller ordered its custodial bank to deliver 
securities to another custodial bank for deposit to a buyer’s 
account. The seller’s bank removed the securities from the 
seller’s account (literally taking engraved certificates out of a 
vault), verified the count, and packaged the securities for 
delivery. A messenger carried the securities to the buyer’s bank 
and received a receipt and possibly a check for payment. 
(Payment could also be effected by a separate wire transfer of 
funds.) The buyer’s bank counted the securities, verified the 
count, credited the buyer’s account, and placed the certificates 
in a vault. The whole process took at least two hours from start 
to finish.4 
With one important exception, transferring bearer 
securities between cities was a slower and more expensive 
process because of the time and cost associated with shipping 
the securities (typically by registered mail). The exception 
occurred when securities had to be shipped between cities in 
which Federal Reserve Banks or branches were located. In that 
With one important exception, transferring 
bearer securities between cities was a 
slower and more expensive process 
because of the time and cost associated 
with shipping the securities. The exception 
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case, the securities could be moved by a Commissioner of 
Public Debt (CPD) transfer—another fiscal agency function of 
the Reserve Banks. 
Suppose, for example, Irving Trust Company (a New York 
clearing bank for nonbank dealers in the 1960s) wanted to 
transfer bearer bonds to Bank of America in San Francisco to 
settle a sale of the bonds by a dealer that cleared through Irving. 
On instructions from the dealer, Irving would withdraw the 
bonds from the dealer’s account and deliver them to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York with instructions to have 
the bonds credited to the Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco for Bank of America’s account. The New York Fed 
would add the bonds to the inventory of unissued securities 
that it held as a fiscal agent of the United States and send a wire 
notice to the San Francisco Fed to remove a comparable 
quantity of the same bonds from the inventory that it held as 
fiscal agent and deliver the bonds to Bank of America. (Box 2 
describes the private wire system used to send messages 
between Reserve Banks.) Irving could request delivery of the 
bonds against payment (in which case, the San Francisco Fed 
would debit Bank of America’s reserve account for the invoice 
price and advise the New York Fed to credit Irving’s account 
for the same amount) or Irving could ask for delivery free of 
payment (in which case, it would arrange some other way for 
Bank of America to pay for the bonds).5
CPD transfers converted bearer securities in one city into a 
like amount of securities in another city without physically 
moving the securities; they essentially eliminated the 
geographic separation of buyers and sellers in different cities. 
In 1965, a Reserve Bank charged a flat fee of $5 for each CPD 
transfer.6 This fee was comparable to the cost of registered mail 
(about 20 cents per $1,000) for transfers of $25,000; it was less 
than the cost of registered mail for larger transfers. However, 
CPD transfers did nothing to reduce the costs of safekeeping 
bearer securities, and they did nothing to reduce the costs of 
transferring securities within a city.
2.6 The Costs of Safekeeping and 
Transferring Bearer Securities
It is useful to preface our examination of the Fed book-entry 
system’s emergence after 1965 by summarizing the economic 
incentives for the system:
• Safekeeping bearer securities required expensive vault 
space and trustworthy workers to clip coupons. 
• Transferring bearer securities required counting and 
re-counting the securities, as well as reliable messengers 
to deliver the securities.
• Bills and bearer bonds were liable to be lost or stolen, so 
custodians had to insure themselves against loss.
By the mid-1960s, the costs of safekeeping and transferring 
bearer Treasury securities had become so large that market 
participants began to seek better ways of holding and 
transferring ownership of the government’s promises. The rise 
Box 2
The Federal Reserve Private Wire System
The Federal Reserve private wire system was inaugurated on 
June 7, 1918, to facilitate telegraphic communication between the 
twelve District Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Reserve Board, 
and the Department of the Treasury. The wire system 
accommodated an expansion in Federal Reserve System messages 
that followed the initiation of Federal Reserve clearing and 
collection of commercial bank checks in mid-1916 and the growth 
of  Treasury financing operations during World War I. (System 
messages had previously been sent by commercial telegraph.) 
Message volume was expected to increase further in July 1918, 
when the frequency of inter-District settlements was to change 
from weekly to daily.a
The private wire system was upgraded several times as a result 
of technological developments and growth in message volume. A 
scarcity of telegraph operators in the late 1920s led to the gradual 
adoption of teletype machines and the replacement of telegraphers 
with less expensive typists.b In July 1953, the system underwent a 
major upgrade when the manual teletype system was replaced with 
a perforated paper tape system configured around a semi-
automatic switching center in Richmond, Virginia.c The paper 
tape system lasted until 1970, when continued growth in the 
volume of money and securities transfers prompted the Fed to 
upgrade again, this time to a fully automatic computer-based 
system built around a switching center in Culpeper, Virginia.d In 
early 1971, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York installed a new 
computer, the Sigma-5, to interface with the Culpeper Switch and 
to maintain the cash and securities accounts of member banks in 
the Second District.e The Culpeper Switch and the Sigma-5 
remained in use beyond the end of the time period examined in 
this article. 
a Smith (1956, pp. 11-24).
b Smith (1956, pp. 32-5).
c Smith (1956, pp. 44-7), Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 
(1960), and Vollkommer (1970, pp. 23-5).
d Vollkommer (1970, pp. 26-8), Hoey and Vollkommer (1971, 
pp. 23-4), and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (1975).
e Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1972a, 1972b, 1984).38 Origins of the Federal Reserve Book-Entry System
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in costs was attributable to two factors: steady growth in the 
total amount of marketable Treasury debt outstanding and an 
increasing concentration of that debt at short and intermediate 
maturities (Chart 1). Short- and intermediate-term debt 
tended to be held by investors who had relatively volatile cash 
needs and who bought and sold securities more frequently than 
those with longer investment horizons who bought long-term 
bonds. Chart 2 shows that average daily trading volume by 
reporting dealers rose from about $1.4 billion in 1958 to 
approximately $1.75 billion between 1962 and 1964.
Reliable data on safekeeping costs in the mid-1960s are not 
available. However, Manypenny (1986, p. 29) reports that the 
cost of safekeeping a bearer municipal bond in the mid-1980s 
was about $6 per year, and that safekeeping costs for bearer 
Treasury bonds in the mid-1960s were comparable. There are, 
of course, no data on book-entry costs for the mid-1960s, but 
Manypenny (p. 29) reports that the cost of safekeeping a book-
entry Treasury security in the mid-1980s was about $1.50 per 
year. The prospect of anything remotely similar to a 75 percent 
reduction in safekeeping costs would have provided a powerful 
incentive to develop a book-entry system.
3.  The Government Securities 
Clearing Arrangement
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York participated in a 
disproportionate share of all CPD transfers because many of 
the largest Treasury dealers, and many of the largest custodial 
banks, were located in New York. As a result, the New York Fed 
ran a large and expensive operations department, receiving 
bearer securities from dealers and custodial banks for wire 
transfer to buyers elsewhere in the nation and delivering bearer 
securities pursuant to wire transfers from sellers outside New 
York. As the volume of trading in Treasury securities rose, the 
New York Fed developed a growing interest in innovative 
arrangements that might reduce the costs of CPD transfers. 
Hoey and Vollkommer (1971, p. 24) note that the New York 
Fed had been “greatly concerned about the cost . . . to itself and 
to the commercial banks in New York City, entailed in the 
physical receipt and delivery of U.S. Government securities.” 
Davis and Hoey (1973, p. 122) observe that “from time to time 
[the New York Fed had] considered various proposals to 
reduce the substantial volume of Government securities that 
are delivered daily to and from the Bank . . . in connection with 
interdistrict telegraphic transfers of [Treasury] securities.”
During the winter of 1964-65, the New York Fed proposed 
a novel netting plan for CPD transfers. During a business day, 
it would allow a member bank to request (by teletype) a CPD 
transfer without requiring simultaneous receipt of the 
securities to be transferred. It would maintain a record of the 
bank’s requests, as well as of the messages that it received from 
other Reserve Banks requesting CPD deliveries to the same 
bank. At about 3 p.m., the New York Fed would compute the 
By the mid-1960s, the costs of 
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bank’s net transfers in each outstanding Treasury issue and 
request that the bank settle up by delivering or receiving bearer 
securities.7 This plan, the Government Securities Clearing 
Arrangement, was viewed as likely to reduce by as much as 
80 percent deliveries of the bearer securities required to settle 
CPD transfers.8 It was, for all practical purposes, an intraday 
book-entry system. Two New York Fed officials later noted that 
“the establishment of the [GSCA] represented a major 
departure from the time-honored principle that transfers of 
Government securities required physical delivery to the 
purchaser, or his agent, of the pieces of paper representing 
ownership.” 9 After a trial program in the second half of 1965, 
the GSCA was officially inaugurated in January 1966.
The GSCA initially included only Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company and Irving Trust. Six more banks joined in the 
second half of 1966,10 motivated by the New York Fed’s 
decision in August 1966 to allow banks to “redirect” incoming 
securities to other banks. This was a crucial innovation because 
it allowed a bank to use its book-entry credits to settle an 
unrelated delivery obligation to another bank. A New York Fed 
official noted that “this was . . . the first time that Government 
securities had been transferred between member banks . . . 
without physical delivery.” 11 Subsequently, the GSCA was 
expanded to accommodate new-issue take-downs and 
denominational exchanges.12
The GSCA was important primarily because it lowered the 
cost of transferring ownership of Treasury securities. It was 
never a full-fledged book-entry system because accumulated 
credits and debits were eliminated every afternoon by physical 
delivery of bearer securities. The GSCA did not reduce the need 
for vault space or coupon clipping, and it did not eliminate 
physical delivery of bearer securities. However, the 
arrangement was the first practical application of the concepts 
of book-entry ownership and transfer of Treasury securities, it 
gave the Federal Reserve valuable experience operating an 
early-stage book-entry system, and—as we will discuss—it 
played a crucial role in resolving the “insurance crisis” of 
1970-71.
4.  Origins of the Book-Entry System
The most significant factor in the early development of the 
Federal Reserve book-entry system was the familiarity of the 
District Reserve Banks with safekeeping securities. Their 
experience resulted primarily from holding securities pledged 
by member banks as collateral on discount-window loans and 
against deposits of public funds, such as Treasury Tax and Loan 
balances. (The role of the Reserve Banks in holding securities 
pledged against deposits of public funds is described in Box 1.) 
Additionally, the Reserve Banks safekept unpledged securities 
owned by geographically remote member banks.13 This service, 
provided free to those banks,14 kept the securities readily 
accessible if a bank decided to pledge them against a loan or 
deposit of public funds. (Federal Reserve Banks did not 
safekeep securities owned by nearby banks because those banks 
could readily deliver securities from their own vaults and 
because the Reserve Banks lacked vault space.15) The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York had particularly deep experience 
with safekeeping practices because it also safekept securities 
held for the System Open Market Account.16 Safekeeping 
securities gave the Reserve Banks experience running vault 
facilities, hiring and retaining a trustworthy labor force, and 
clipping coupons, all of which made Federal Reserve officials 
well aware of the costs of providing custodial services.
Despite the advantages associated with the Fed’s safekeeping 
of securities, a significant problem ultimately arose. In early 
1963, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco reported 
publicly the disappearance of $7.5 million of bearer Treasury 
securities sometime in mid-1962.17 Following a Congressional 
investigation of the loss,18 the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System asked the Conference of Presidents of 
the Federal Reserve Banks to examine whether Treasury 
securities safekept at the Reserve Banks might be converted to 
book-entry form.19 The Board was interested in lowering the 
cost of clipping coupons and relaxing constraints imposed by 
limited vault space, but it was particularly interested in 
reducing the risk of lost or stolen securities.20 A subcommittee 
of the Conference of Presidents investigated the matter and 
quickly concluded that a book-entry system was both “practical 
and desirable.” 21
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4.1 Issues in Innovating a Book-Entry System
During the mid-1960s, Federal Reserve officials focused on 
developing institutional arrangements that would facilitate the 
conversion to book-entry form of definitive securities already 
safekept at Reserve Banks; they did not address the possibility 
of a larger system. However, implementing even a limited 
book-entry system proved to be extraordinarily difficult. Two 
particularly vexatious issues—first identified in December 
1964 by the Subcommittee of Counsel on Fiscal Agency 
Operations of the Conference of Presidents and analyzed more 
fully in a seminal study by Richard Debs and Edward Guy of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York22—involved the basis for 
Reserve Bank operation of a book-entry system and pledges of 
book-entry securities.
The threshold issue was whether the Reserve Banks would 
operate the system in their individual capacities or as fiscal 
agents of the United States. The Reserve Banks were 
experienced holding definitive Treasury securities in both 
capacities. For example, a Reserve Bank acted in an individual 
capacity when it held securities pledged against discount-
window loans, but it acted as a fiscal agent when it held 
securities pledged against Treasury Tax and Loan balances. 
If a Reserve Bank operated a book-entry system strictly in its 
individual capacity, it might—like a private depository—be 
obliged to hold definitive securities in its vaults against its 
book-entry liabilities.23 This practice would clearly limit the 
cost savings available from operating the system.
The need to hold definitive securities could be avoided by 
providing that a Reserve Bank acted as a fiscal agent of the 
United States when it created, carried, and extinguished book-
entry Treasury securities. However, if a Reserve Bank operated 
a book-entry system strictly as a fiscal agent, it might have to 
continue to safekeep, in definitive form, unpledged securities 
owned by member banks and others in order to avoid conflict 
between its fiscal agency obligations and its custodial responsi-
bilities to the beneficial owners of the safekept securities.24
Underlying the question of whether the Reserve Banks 
should operate a book-entry system in their individual 
capacities or as fiscal agents was the recognition that a book-
entry system might make all but impossible a clean distinction 
between the two operating bases. One early analysis observed 
that a book-entry system “by its very nature ‘meshes’ the 
actions which a Reserve Bank undertakes as custodian on the 
one hand and as fiscal agent on the other.” 25 This observation 
suggested that the Banks might have to operate the system in 
some sort of hybrid capacity.
The second major issue in developing a book-entry system 
involved liens on Treasury securities. Liens were governed by 
state law and generally required expensive and time-
consuming public filings to be effective against an innocent 
buyer of a pledged asset. However, possession by a pledgee was 
sufficient if the asset was a security. This resulted in important 
savings in creating liens on securities. Since the notion of 
“possession” of a book-entry security was unclear, there was a 
distinct possibility that a pledgee who wanted to establish a lien 
on a book-entry security might have to make a public filing of 
the lien.26 Any such requirement would markedly reduce the 
attractiveness of book-entry securities,27 but the alternative—
amending numerous state laws to eliminate the need for public 
filings of liens on book-entry securities—was likely to be costly 
and time-consuming.
4.2 The Initial Implementation
In the interest of limiting the range of problems that had to be 
resolved, Treasury and Federal Reserve officials kept the initial 
implementation of the book-entry system quite narrow. The 
first version went into effect on January 1, 1968,28 and provided 
for just three categories of deposits:29
1. member bank securities held for investment and depos-
ited with a Federal Reserve Bank for safekeeping,
2. member bank securities pledged as collateral on a loan 
from a Federal Reserve Bank, and
3. securities pledged as collateral against federal government 
deposits.
Left out—at least for the time being—were securities held by 
member banks for trading (rather than investment) purposes, 
securities safekept by member banks for their customers 
(including securities owned by nonbank dealers), and 
securities held by a Federal Reserve Bank as collateral for a 
purpose other than to secure a Bank loan or federal 
government deposit.
Implementing even a limited book-entry 
system proved to be extraordinarily 
difficult. Two particularly vexatious 
issues . . . involved the basis for Reserve 
Bank operation of a book-entry system 
and pledges of book-entry securities.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2004 41
With respect to securities included in the new system, a 
member bank could deposit Treasury securities (in bearer or 
registered form) to its book-entry accounts, withdraw 
securities (in bearer or registered form) from its accounts, 
order a transfer of book-entry securities to a book-entry 
account of another member bank at the same Federal Reserve 
Bank, or order a Commissioner of Public Debt transfer of 
securities held in book-entry form. Convertibility of book-
entry securities to bearer and registered forms was considered 
a “cornerstone to the practical acceptance of the book-entry 
[system].” 30 (Provision for conversion of a novel form of a 
Treasury claim to a more familiar form was used later to 
enhance the acceptance of STRIPS and foreign-targeted 
notes.31)
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York signaled the 
importance of the new system when it announced that, for the 
first time, it was prepared to safekeep, in its book-entry system, 
securities owned by member banks located in Lower 
Manhattan.32 Just as CPD transfers had eliminated distance as 
a significant factor in transferring Treasury securities, the 
book-entry system would eliminate vault space and coupon 
clipping as significant factors in holding Treasuries.
The initial implementation of the book-entry system 
accommodated only two pledgees: a Reserve Bank (pursuant to 
a discount-window loan) and the United States (pursuant to a 
deposit of public funds). The question of whether either had to 
file its liens was resolved by relying on the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution and the doctrine of federal 
preemption of state law.33 The Treasury regulation authorizing 
the book-entry system simply declared that no filing was 
necessary and provided that a lien could be established by 
making an appropriate entry in the records of the system:
The making of such an entry shall have the effect of a 
delivery of definitive Treasury securities in bearer form . . . 
and shall effect a perfected security interest . . . in favor of 
the pledgee . . . . No filing or recording with a public 
official or officer shall be necessary to perfect the pledge 
or security interest.34
Importantly, the Treasury did not have to promulgate detailed 
provisions for security interests on book-entry Treasury 
securities because its regulation implicitly deferred to state law 
on all matters other than the method of perfecting a security 
interest.35
Whether the Reserve Banks would operate the book-entry 
system in their own capacity, as fiscal agents, or in some hybrid 
capacity was not clearly resolved in the first implementation. 
Early in the planning process, the Conference of Presidents 
decided that, in the interests of simplicity, the system should be 
operated strictly as a fiscal agency function.36 That decision 
allowed the Treasury to preempt state law on security pledges. 
(A Reserve Bank operating a book-entry system strictly in its 
individual capacity could not have preempted state law on its 
own.) Early drafts of the Treasury regulation authorizing the 
system consequently spoke only of the Reserve Banks acting as 
fiscal agents of the United States.37 
During the spring of 1967, Edward Guy, General Counsel of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, became uneasy that 
discount-window loans by that Bank might not be adequately 
secured by pledges of book-entry securities recorded in a 
system operated by the Bank solely as a fiscal agent of the 
United States.38 Guy also became uneasy that the Bank might 
be unable to fulfill its responsibilities to the beneficial owners 
of unpledged securities that it held in safekeeping.39 As a result 
of Guy’s concerns, the final version of the Treasury regulation 
authorizing the system provided that:
The book-entry procedure shall apply to Treasury 
securities now on deposit or hereafter deposited in 
accounts with any Reserve Bank (1) as collateral pledged 
to a Reserve Bank (in its individual capacity) for advances 
by it, (2) as collateral pledged to the United States [against 
deposits of public funds], and (3) by a member bank … 
for its sole account and in lieu of the safekeeping of 
definitive Treasury securities by a Reserve Bank in its 
individual capacity [emphasis added].40
The references to individual capacity suggest that a Reserve 
Bank acted, at least in part, in its individual capacity when it 
held book-entry securities pledged against discount-window 
loans and when it safekept unpledged member bank securities. 
However, the regulation did not indicate how that assessment 
could be reconciled with a more specific provision that, in 
operating a book-entry system, a Reserve Bank acted as a fiscal 
agent of the United States.41
The first fruits of the new system were modest. In the 
beginning of 1968, $218 billion of marketable Treasury debt 
was outstanding but only $2.6 billion of bearer securities was 
converted to book-entry form at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
In the interest of limiting the range of 
problems that had to be resolved, 
Treasury and Federal Reserve officials 
kept the initial implementation of the 
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New York.42 However, as Chart 3 shows, by the end of that year 
the twelve Federal Reserve Banks had, in aggregate, converted 
to book-entry form more than 10 percent—$36 billion—of 
Treasury securities.
4.3 The Second Implementation
Eighteen months after the initial implementation, the Treasury 
and the Reserve Banks extended the book-entry system in two 
important dimensions.43 First, they expanded the scope of the 
system beyond the original three accounts and provided that 
the system could be used for Treasury securities deposited for 
any purpose in additional accounts maintained by the Reserve 
Banks.44
Second, the Treasury extended the scope of its preemption 
of state law on security interests to include all pledgees of book-
entry Treasury securities.45 This action enabled the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York to include securities held for the 
System Open Market Account and pledged against currency 
issued by the Reserve Banks. In January 1970, $56 billion of 
bearer securities held for the System Open Market Account 
moved to book-entry form.46 The expanded pledge provision 
also allowed the Reserve Banks to include securities beneficially 
owned by member banks and others that were pledged to so-
called “third parties”—such as state and local governments and 
federal bankruptcy courts—as performance guarantees and 
that were held at Federal Reserve Banks.
The desire of Treasury and Federal Reserve officials to 
include securities pledged to third parties led to an important 
change in the operating basis of the book-entry system. 
Numerous statutes that provided for deposits of securities with 
a Federal Reserve Bank as performance guarantees 
contemplated that the securities would be deposited with a 
Bank acting in its individual capacity rather than as a fiscal 
agent of the United States. It followed that the securities could 
not be deposited into a book-entry system operated by the 
Reserve Banks strictly as fiscal agents.47 
To facilitate inclusion of securities pledged to third parties, 
the regulatory provision for the new accounts stated that:
The application of the book-entry procedure [to securities 
deposited in the new accounts] shall not derogate from or 
adversely affect the relationships that would otherwise 
exist between a Reserve Bank in its individual capacity and 
its depositors concerning any deposits under this 
paragraph. Whenever the book-entry procedure is applied 
to such Treasury securities, the Reserve Bank is authorized 
to take all action necessary in respect of the book-entry 
procedure to enable such Reserve Bank in its individual 
capacity to perform its obligations as depositary with 
respect to such Treasury securities [emphasis added].48
Federal Reserve officials understood that, pursuant to this 
provision, the Reserve Banks would accept deposits in the new 
accounts in a dual capacity, both as fiscal agents of the United 
States and in their individual capacities.49 The second sentence 
in the quoted provision suggests that a Bank’s individual 
responsibility to depositors might, in fact, trump its fiscal 
agency responsibilities.50 Officials described the dual-capacity 
plan as “the most significant” aspect of the second 
implementation of the book-entry system.51 The introduction 
of dual capacity clarified and settled the matter of the operating 
basis of the system.
As shown in Chart 3, by the end of 1970, the Federal Reserve 
book-entry system accounted for $121 billion of Treasury 
securities—almost half of the $248 billion of marketable 
Treasury debt outstanding. Virtually all of the definitive 
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By the end of 1970 . . . the Federal 
Reserve had . . . accomplished the 
objectives that it had identified in 1963: 
lowering the cost of clipping coupons, 
relaxing constraints imposed by limited 
vault space, and—most importantly—
reducing the risk of misplacing securities 
that it held as custodian or pledgee.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2004 43
securities formerly held in the vaults of the Reserve Banks had 
been converted. The Federal Reserve had thus accomplished 
the objectives that it had identified in 1963: lowering the cost of 
clipping coupons, relaxing constraints imposed by limited 
vault space, and—most importantly—reducing the risk of 
misplacing securities that it held as custodian or pledgee.
5.  The Insurance Crisis and the 
Expansion of the Book-Entry 
System
Following the second implementation of the book-entry 
system, only two important categories of Treasury securities 
remained entirely outside the system: those owned by member 
banks for trading purposes and those safekept in member bank 
vaults for bank customers.52 The Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York was particularly interested in extending the book-entry 
system to include those securities and to leverage more fully the 
economic advantages inherent in book-entry securities.
As early as 1965, two officers of the New York Fed had 
welcomed the development of a book-entry system because it
appears to be an efficient and effective method of 
handling Government securities. This Bank has long been 
of the view that ultimately a book-entry type of procedure 
for Government securities should be developed to cover 
all or nearly all holders of such obligations. Over the long 
run, such a procedure . . . would appear to be a more 
efficient and probably less costly procedure for handling 
the public debt.53
In announcing in mid-1967 the first implementation of the 
new system, the New York Fed emphasized the economic 
advantages of the book-entry system: 
The . . . procedure is designed to help the Treasury 
Department and the Federal Reserve Banks handle a large 
volume of Treasury securities through the use of modern 
high-speed data-processing equipment. Use of the new 
procedure should lead to increased efficiency in the 
handling and servicing of Treasury securities by the 
Federal Reserve Banks.54
More concretely, the New York Fed began planning for the 
introduction of a new computer, the Sigma-5 (see Box 2), to 
support the new system.55
In the summer of 1968—well before the second 
implementation of the book-entry system—Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York officials had begun to seek the cooperation 
of the large New York banks in developing a more extensive 
system.56 The banks expressed interest, but believed that 
change might not come quickly. One official noted that “some 
expanded form of book entry procedure is inevitable . . . . But 
how to work toward it and at what speed are matters that need 
further discussion.”57
In late 1970, the cost-benefit calculus of expanding the 
book-entry system changed swiftly and dramatically. In the 
wake of several large and well-publicized losses of bearer 
Treasury securities—including securities worth $13.2 million 
from Morgan Guaranty Trust Company in October 196958—
Continental Insurance Company, the leading writer of 
insurance policies that covered thefts of securities from 
commercial banks, announced that it would restrict or 
terminate coverage in 1971.59 Continental’s announcement 
threatened to impose severe limits on trading in Treasury 
securities because dealers and clearing banks could not bear the 
risk of uninsured losses of the magnitudes that had been 
occurring.60 Suddenly, the cost of continuing to settle 
transactions with bearer securities became immeasurably 
greater, and the idea of expanding the book-entry system 
became immeasurably more attractive.
The threat to the liquidity of the Treasury market infused 
Treasury and Federal Reserve officials, as well as private market 
participants, with a sense of urgency in expanding the book-
entry system.61 In the closing days of 1970, Continental agreed 
to continue coverage, giving the Treasury and the Fed time to 
act.62 During the first quarter of 1971, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York worked with the banks participating in the 
Government Securities Clearing Arrangement to bring their 
trading account securities and the securities owned by their 
customers—including customers who were nonbank dealers—
into the system.63 The initial effort to expand the system 
focused on the GSCA banks because those banks “were the 
most vulnerable to the problem of insurance coverage.” 64
The expansion of the book-entry system to securities owned 
by customers of the GSCA banks gave those banks and the New 
York Fed valuable experience operating a system that included 
securities owned by customers of member banks. The 
The threat to the liquidity of the Treasury 
market [in 1970-71] infused Treasury 
and Federal Reserve officials, as well 
as private market participants, with a 
sense of urgency in expanding the 
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expansion was viewed by Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
officials “as a means of experimenting with . . . new procedures 
and developing a basic pattern of book-entry accounts that 
could accommodate the operations of all member banks.” 65 
Additionally, it allowed the New York Fed to begin to integrate 
its book-entry system with the CPD transfers that continued to 
lie at the heart of the GSCA. Outgoing CPD transfers could be 
charged promptly (on a gross basis) to a bank’s book-entry 
account, and incoming transfers could be credited promptly, 
rather than settled on a net basis with a physical delivery of 
bearer bonds at the end of the day. Installation of the Sigma-5 
computer at the New York Fed in early 1971 facilitated 
integration of the GSCA and book-entry systems.66
Expansion of the book-entry system to accommodate 
Treasury securities held by any member bank for any customer 
was completed in March 1973.67 (Martin [1985] explains how 
customers hold book-entry securities indirectly through 
depository institutions that offer custodial services.) As shown 
in Chart 3, the completion of the system infrastructure led to a 
gradual expansion in the fraction of marketable Treasury debt 
held in book-entry form to 65 percent at the end of 1973 and 
78 percent at the end of 1975. By the end of 1980, almost 
94 percent of marketable Treasury debt was held in book-entry 
form.
As increasing amounts of Treasury securities were 
converted to book-entry form, Treasury officials began to 
contemplate the elimination of definitive securities in new 
offerings.68 In August 1976, the Treasury announced that it 
would stop issuing fifty-two-week bills in bearer form before 
the end of the year and that it would stop issuing bearer 
thirteen- and twenty-six-week bills in 1977.69 The Treasury 
stopped issuing bearer bonds in September 1982, and it did not 
issue bearer notes after December 1982.70 The last step came in 
August 1986, when the Treasury introduced a new book-entry 
system, TreasuryDirect, designed to accommodate retail 
investors, and announced that it would not subsequently issue 
notes or bonds in registered form.71
6. Conclusion
The conversion of U.S. Treasury securities from physical to 
book-entry form was a major development in the history of the 
Treasury market. The process began in 1966 with the 
introduction of an early book-entry system known as the 
Government Securities Clearing Arrangement; twenty years 
later, it ended with the last issue of registered debt. 
The first stage of the process—the development of the 
GSCA in 1965-66—was motivated exclusively by cost 
considerations, involved only a few market participants with 
substantially similar interests, and was completed relatively 
quickly and without any significant reshaping of either legal or 
regulatory structures. It was, however, the first practical 
application of book-entry procedures to the Treasury securities 
market. The second stage—the creation of a book-entry system 
for securities already safekept at Reserve Banks—began after a 
loss of securities at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
Compared with the first stage, it involved a larger number of 
participants with somewhat divergent interests, took longer, 
and required a significant reshaping of the legal and regulatory 
environments. Two key moves were made at the second stage: 
the Treasury agreed to authorize the Reserve Banks to operate 
the book-entry system in a dual capacity and the Treasury 
decided it would preempt state law on perfecting liens on 
Treasuries. The third stage—the expansion of the book-entry 
system to include dealer securities and securities owned by 
customers of member banks—was propelled by the “insurance 
crisis” of 1970-71, and involved many more participants than 
the first two phases did.
The book-entry system was the product of three key factors: 
the interest of the Reserve Banks and the Treasury in lowering 
their operating costs and risks, the goal of the Reserve Banks 
and the Treasury of preserving market liquidity, and the desire 
of the Reserve Banks to prune the operating costs of member 
banks. The interest in lowering Reserve Bank operating costs 
and the operating costs of member banks was evident in the 
GSCA’s development (and, to a lesser extent, in the expansion 
of the book-entry system after 1970); the Federal Reserve’s 
desire to reduce operating risk exposure was a driving force 
behind the system’s initial development; the Federal Reserve’s 
and Treasury’s mutual intention to preserve market liquidity 
vastly accelerated the system’s expansion after 1970. 
Significantly, the early history of the book-entry system 
suggests that the prospect of greater efficiency by itself may not 
always suffice to bring about rapid change that requires 
coordination among players with varied interests. Rather, the 
pace of change sometimes depends on exogenous shocks to 
bring different players together to meet a common goal. It is no 
doubt difficult to imagine the modern Treasury market 
existing in the absence of a book-entry system. Yet it is also 
difficult to imagine market participants moving from bearer to 
book-entry securities as quickly as they did had they not faced 
the repercussions of two such shocks: a sizable loss of securities 
from a Federal Reserve Bank in 1962 and an “insurance crisis” 
in 1970-71.Endnotes
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